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To read the press, one might think that China’s economy would soon surpass in size and 
prosperity that of the world’s remaining superpower.  There is some basis for this 
speculation, though it is wildly premature at best, and, at worst, very unlikely for several 
decades, if ever.  The correct factual basis is that China is a very large place with an even 
larger population.  The other correct ingredient in such a story is that, for the past 28 
years or so, China has exhibited extremely rapid growth.  If its massive population had an 
average level of productivity for what the IMF calls a “middle income country” or that of 
some of their wealthier neighbors, China would already have the largest GDP in the 
world. That is not likely to happen for another 30 years or so, at the earliest.  More 
importantly, even under the best of trends sustained for far longer than is likely, China 
will not reach the US standard of living, not to mention surpass it, until mid-century.  
More likely, even under very optimistic assumptions, China will not reach the US 
standard of living until late in this century. Nonetheless, due to the size of its economy 
and markets, it will have a relatively large share of production and consumption of most 
goods and services in a few decades.      
 
The key facts that determine these possibilities are that China is a country that is almost 
identically the same size in land area as the US and has over four times as many people  
(1.3 billion versus 300 million people).  Its output or income have been growing at nearly 
10 percent per year since reforms began in the late 1970s, but earlier the country’s 
economy regressed for several decades due to its political turmoil and exploitation of its 
people by a political party and class backed by an economically and politically powerful 
army..   Economic reform has allowed the country to climb out of a very deep hole, but 
there remains far to go before reclaiming its earlier relative ranking in the world 
economy. Fortunately, the notion of convergence means that the further behind a country 
gets, the more likely it is, if allowed, to grow faster in order to catch up. 
 
To take a long view, consider that in 1820 China produced about 28.7 percent of the 
world’s GDP with about 35.7 percent of its population, which implies that it had a 
productivity level close to 80 percent of the world average.  By 2005, despite incredible 
growth of near 10 percent per year over the past 28 years, China produced 5 percent of 
the world’s GDP despite having a smaller, but still world-beating 20.2 percent of the 
world’s population.  By the same standard, China’s productivity had fallen to about 25 
percent of the world average.  In contrast, the US rose from 1.8 percent of the world’s 
output with about 0.9 percent of the world’s population (already about twice the world 
average GDP per person) to claim almost the same share of output as China had in 1820, 
28.1 percent, with only 4.6 percent of the world population, or about six times the world 
average GDP per person.  Had China kept its relative level of productivity, just keeping 
pace with the world average, its GDP and standard of living would have been over three 
times higher than today and it would already have a GDP level in excess of Japan’s, or been the second largest in the world, and a standard of living approaching that of Chile 
instead of Morocco.      
 
The basic facts about China’s income and growth are summarized in Table 1.  China is 
classified as a lower middle income country by the International Monetary Fund, but it 
has grown rapidly for the past 28 years since the transformation from a command to a 
market economy began, averaging about 9.6 percent per year from 1980 to 2005.   The 
growth rate data in the table are for the period 1990-2005 and form the “best case” 
baseline scenario, where growth rates continue to hold steady.  The past period chosen is 
somewhat arbitrary. The Chinese growth rate used here is a little slower than a shorter 
period at the end of the interval, but faster than the whole period of reform, which would 
include some initial years with slower growth and also some years of slow growth that 
followed a couple of highly inflationary periods. US growth is also faster than in the most 
recent five years at the end of the period, but slightly slower than for the past 25 years.   
 
 Table 1 
Basic facts of China and US income and growth  




  China  US  China  US 
GDP 
 ($ billions) 
$2278  $12455  9.92%  2.98% 
Population 
(billions) 
1.304  0.298  1.08  1.02 
GDP per 
person ($) 




7198  41399  NA  NA 
Source: GDP: Economic Insight 
    Population: Asian Development Bank and UN 
    PPP-based GDP per capita: International Monetary Fund 
 
 
Best case scenario 
In the best case scenario, China and the US would continue to grow at the same pace as 
over the 15 years from 1990 to 2005.  For China, this is considered the best case because 
no economy has grown so fast for such a prolonged period over the past 50 years, if ever.  
Also, population growth is expected to continue to slow in both countries, more so in 
China.  Finally, the US is expected to have slowing productivity growth according to the 
projections of the Social Security Trustees and most experts, and this is even more likely 
in China as it converges toward US productivity levels.  
 
Extrapolating the Chinese and US growth rates shown in Table 1 implies that China will 
catch up with the size of the US GDP in 26 years, or in 2031.  The power of compound 
interest is illustrated by the fact that it would take 18 years to catch up to the size of US GDP in 2005, but within another eight years China would expand its output enough to 
match over a quarter century of US growth.  
 
Because of China’s population size advantage, its GDP can grow to the same size as the 
US economy with little productivity growth.  Just as low productivity holds down output, 
however, the expected convergence of productivity, output per worker, means that 
China’s productivity will grow faster than that in the US, at least until it catches up.  
Since productivity determines the standard of living, this means that China’s standard of 
living would continue to rise faster than that in the US well beyond the period when its 
GDP catches up to that in the US.   
 
In the best case scenario, China’s standard of living, measured by its GDP per person, 
would continue to improve relative to that in the US well beyond 2031.  In 2031, for 
example, based on the continuation of conditions described in Table 1, China’s GDP per 
capita would be about one-fourth that in the US, but it would have joined the group of 
high-income countries, at least based on today’s definition.  China would converge to 
the same GDP per capita as the US in 2053, under the “best case” assumptions.  The 
per capita GDP in both countries would be about $105,000 per person, measured in 2005 
prices, about 2.5 times the current US level.   
 
Note that the table also provides data on PPP-based GDP per capita.  These data are 
intended by the IMF to better capture comparable measures of the standard of living 
because they correct for distortions in exchange rates or prices that could bias 
comparisons based on market prices. These IMF measures suggest a much smaller gap in 
the current standard of living in China and, together with the “best case” growth rates, 
suggest convergence in the standard of living by 2032, about the same time as GDP 
convergence would occur. In China’s case, at least until 2006, there is little reason to 
believe these distortions could lead to an understatement of Chinese GDP, not to mention 
an understatement by a factor of more than three. If they did however, separate 
calculations here for GDP and the standard of living would be unnecessary because PPP-
based GDP per capita convergence would occur at about the same point as that for actual 
GDP.       
 
Optimistic case scenario 
China and the US are not expected to be able to continue the trends of the past 15 years, 
however.  The UN projects that China’s population will peak in about 2030 and then 
decline slightly, averaging about a 0.1 percent rate from 2005-50. Similarly, US 
population growth is expected to slow, though not as much, averaging about a 0.6 percent 
rate from 2005-50.  If these trends are included, both countries’ GDP will grow more 
slowly. For example, the US Social Security Trustees expect US real GDP to expand at a 
2.1 percent rate from 2005-50, with much of the slowing coming around 2012 and 
beyond.  A slowing in GDP growth in China due to slower growth of the population and 
labor force, and because of slowing productivity growth as convergence occurs, easily 
could bring GDP growth to about 8 percent, in a still very optimistic case.  Since the US 
is slowing too, however, this does not have much effect on the convergence results. 
China would still, under these optimistic assumptions, reach the same GDP size as the US by 2035 and match its GDP per capita by 2057, both only four years later 
than in the “best case.”   
 
Plausible case scenario 
Convergence is typically expected to occur primarily because higher rates of return to 
investment are expected in China than in the US until convergence occurs, and this in 
turn is expected to lead to more rapid growth of the capital stock per worker in China.  In 
addition, it occurs because China can take advantage of existing and more productive 
technologies until the country has exploited all the highest technology available in the 
world and it can do so relatively cheaply.  Following convergence, however, the 
possibilities become limited as China’s ability to develop new technology through 
importing it would be virtually eliminated and the country would have to rely on its 
ability to develop its own globally-competitive technology. In fact both processes will 
slow growth in productivity and GDP well before convergence actually occurs, actually 
pushing convergence further into the future.  Thus, the optimistic case above is just that.  
Japan’s slowing from the early 1970s to the 1990s is a classic example of this process, as 
are the more recent experiences of China’s Asian Tiger neighbors and its own Special 
Administrative Region, Hong Kong.  
 
More importantly, China faces four major trends that require close management to avoid 
major economic and political turmoil.  The first is urbanization.  Only about 43 percent of 
the population currently live in cities and is part of the modern labor force.  Most of the 
population lives in rural areas where economic opportunities are much more limited.  
There is strong pressure to move to cities because of huge differences in income 
possibilities.  Second, nearly half of all enterprises are state-owned and the transition 
from highly inefficient state-owned firms to profitable ones, or more likely to private 
firms, results in major disruption and unemployment.  Both of these trends put strong 
pressure on the central government to slow these processes and to find other ways to 
ameliorate the political pressures arising from relative income disparities. 
 
The third trend is the slowing in population growth which, as noted above is expected to 
bring population expansion to a halt in about 2030 and then to reduce it.  At about that 
time, China is expected to have a median age for its population that is about the same as 
in the US and subsequently its population will continue to age more rapidly.  This will 
create pressures on the social safety net and especially on the retirement system.  
Fortunately, there will still be ample opportunity to develop both the employment 
possibilities of the still large rural population and the productivity of the state-industrial 
sector to continue to boost income growth.   
 
The fourth trend is that such rapid growth in income per person, climbing to at least eight 
times its 1980 level today, creates strong demands for political rights as a large middle 
class begins to emerge. Managing the widening gap between greater economic rights and 
prosperity and a static political system with few rights and little self-determination will 
become increasingly difficult over time.  There will be growing pressures for political 
liberalization and openness, but meeting those demands either too rapidly or too slowly risks political and economic instability.  All of these risks potentially adversely affect 
GDP growth in China.  
 
Faced with burgeoning risks and blessed by earlier rapid convergence, it is not likely that 
China will be able to continue the rapid economic growth assumed in the optimistic case.  
More likely China will begin to slow, like its richer neighbors already have, so that its 
average growth rate will slow further.  A slowing to 6 percent real GDP growth over 
the post-2005 period, mainly achieved by slowing after the next couple of decades, 
would result in China matching the size of the US economy by mid-century and 
converging to a similar standard of living by 2080 or so.  Only slightly slower 
growth could push the latter achievement off to the next century.  No country in the 
world has ever achieved a growth rate as rapid as 6 percent per year over such a 
long period, in this case for over 75 years.  However, though understandable in 
geopolitical terms, China’s growth for the past 28 years defies history by a much greater 
margin.   
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